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朝の紅顔、夕べの白骨
As China has rocketed into the stratosphere of global economic rankings in recent decades,
journalistic and academic accounts of the country ʼs ascent have proliferated like so many
eddies in its superheated plume. For a long time the tone of such works tended towards the
laudatory, extending on occasion to something approaching awe. That tone has not yet
disappeared entirely; traces of it, for example, are still detectable in the claims made about the
China Development Bank by two financial journalists in the preface to their recent sketch of its
rise to its current status as, allegedly, ʻthe worldʼs most powerful bank.ʼ The authors defend this
judgment by asserting that the CDB has ʻarguably…an even more impressive recordʼ than the
Federal Reserve in dealing with the ʻLehman shockʼ, since it ʻdevised a system to fund local
infrastructure projects that is credited with helping China sail through the global financial
crisis while the United States and Europe stumbledʼ (Sanderson and Forsyth, 2013, p. ii). Yes,
they concede, there may be a ʻdark side ʼ to the activities of the bank and its all-powerful
chairman, Chen Yuan; within China itself a good part of the responsibility for problems of rising
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income inequality and a mass of potentially catastrophic bad debt may fairly be laid at the CDBʼ
s door (p. vii), but against this one must set success stories like that of Chery Auto, ʻa perfect
example of how CDB has helped transform Chinaʼs economy and increased its competitivenessʼ
(p. 176), and the immense influence that the CDB wields in Africa and Latin America today.
Reform may be necessary, indeed unavoidable, but one does not sense from this account that
there is a real crisis in the offing, since ʻChina has decent infrastructure and can afford to move
to a more market-based system where consumption is better promoted and capital is freed up
to follow the best, most innovative returnsʼ (p. 180). At most an easy course correction may be
advisable, but there seems to be few worries here about the economy maintaining its rate of
climb.
For others, though, such confidence has always been much harder to sustain, and their
ranks have recently begun to swell. According to one of their number, Michael Pettis, this
reversal of mood among ground-based observers can be dated quite precisely.
Although for many years the China skeptics were very much in the minority amid the sometimes
gushing and largely ahistorical analysis provided by most experts and commentators on China, by
early 2012 it had become increasingly obvious to most economists that the development model that
had generated spectacular growth for the Chinese economy over the past three decades had
reached its limits. (p. 3)
Quite why it should have been at this particular juncture that apprehension began to infect the
majority is an interesting question in its own right, but for the moment it is enough to note that
Pettis seems right to assert that the bulls have indeed been heading for the exit of the China
shop over the past couple of years. And with the stampede gathering pace, the focus on the
problems facing the managers of China Inc. has become much more intense and discussion of
their performance far less guarded. The most serious factors now worrying those tracking
Chinaʼs trajectory include (in no particular order): the rapid approach of the ʻLewis pointʼ and
the consequences that must flow from the ending of Chinaʼs ʻdemographic dividendʼ in the
shape of labor shortages, rising wages and lost competitiveness; the looming prospect of an
ʻagingʼ society in which support for the vast increase in the population of the elderly in coming
decades must devolve on the state, given how the resources of the family have been stretched
to breaking point by the effects of a ʻOne Child Policyʼ now in its fourth decade; the enormous
expansion of debt, both in the official banking sector and in the even more opaque world of
ʻshadow bankingʼ, particularly since the credit boom unleashed by the government to stave off
the effects on employment of the ʻ Lehman shock ʼ; the beginnings of a reversal of the
unprecedented and seemingly inexorable rise in house prices which has been widely
interpreted as constituting a bubble of dimensions equal to, or even greater than, the subprime
blister that burst so painfully in the U.S.A. in 2008; and a tide of stories (one that shows no sign
of ebbing) about waste, inefficiency, misallocation of resources and corruption that seems to
presage a rerun of what was exposed to public view in Spain, Ireland and Greece after Lehman.
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All of this has led to an apparent consensus about the need for a radical and sustained
ʻrebalancingʼ of Chinaʼs economy that will see investment by the government replaced by
private consumption as the main engine of economic growth. The first-stage ʻdevelopment
model ʼ widely credited with propelling China onwards and upwards has now, it seems,
exhausted its fuel and must fall away. But does this mean the end of state capitalism, the much
vaunted system that is said to have rescued China (and the world) when the Westʼs economies
imploded in 2008? Will it simply have to be jettisoned as so much deadweight, leaving a proper
market system to function as the countryʼs chief propulsion unit? Unravelling the knots that
make up this conundrum depends on finding answers to four separate questions. Is systemic
economic change now simply unavoidable? What form must it take if it is to be effective? Is the
dismantling of state capitalism, as a matter of both ideology and practice, politically feasible
within the constraints of the current system? And if it is not, what will happen if it begins to act
as a serious drag on economic growth and China fails to reach escape velocity?
On the issue of whether systemic change is now inescapable, the four works under review
here share a common point of departure; the conviction that the economic arts widely extolled
for providing China with loaves and fishes to date cannot continue to work seeming miracles
henceforth. For Damien Ma and William Adams, ʻ…dramatic change is not only necessary but
also demands some urgency… [given that] none of the factors that fed the Panda Boom could
last indefinitely…ʼ (p. 271). Beyond dispute,
Stasis is no longer an option. Collective recognition is growing among policymakers and political
elites that the only way to alleviate the countryʼs daunting economic and social malaise, as well as to
ensure the resilience of the party-state itself, is once again to embrace change. (pp. 270-271)
Jonathan Fenby ʼ s wide-ranging survey of China ʼ s prospects in the decades ahead is
equally forthright. He unequivocally endorses (pp. 53-61) ex-Prime Minister Wen Jiabaoʼs 2007
pronouncement that the countryʼs development path had become unsustainable, uncoordin-
ated, unbalanced and unstable. These features were, in Fenby ʼs judgment, the product of
ʻstructural weaknesses in the economyʼ which must now take center stage, since ʻHeadlong
growth masked these flaws as the ʻChina modelʼ seemed all-triumphant; now they have to be
addressed if the PRC is to continue to move forwardʼ (p. 63).
Joe Zhangʼs concerns appear somewhat narrower, but they do not inspire a view of the
future that is any more comforting; ʻdeeply worried about the negative real interest rates, and
the parallel escalation of inflation and the credit explosion in the past three decadesʼ in China (p.
89), he can foresee only two scenarios. In the ʻniceʼ one the Peopleʼs Bank of China embarks on a
fundamental rebalancing by raising deposit and lending rates, thus benefitting the countryʼs
long-suffering savers at the expense of state-owned enterprises that have enjoyed the privilege
of cheap capital for decades (one of the central pillars that has sustained the weight of state
capitalism ). True, this will lead to bankruptcies and rising unemployment, but the
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consequences of the other, ʻ nasty, ʼ scenario in which the central bank continues with the
strategy of the past, are far worse.
A crisis will erupt in one of three possible ways.
One is spreading social unrest.
The second is a bursting housing bubble.
The third is a global economic slowdown that coincides with a domestic recession. (p. 91)
It is left to Michael Pettis to put flesh on these bare and cheerless bones by detailing
exactly how China ʼs development model is rapidly losing momentum and why it must be
abandoned. He accepts that the fundamental imbalance it created by prioritising state
investment and export-led growth over private, domestic consumption, should be given credit
for the high rate of growth that the country enjoyed for decades. But continuing with this
approach beyond a certain point (around 2005, it seems) was, he insists, to ignore the lesson
taught to most developing countries in the 20
th
century, notably Brazil in the 1980s; what
happens when an increasingly wasteful investment binge got out of control, failing to produce
adequate returns and so leading to a rapidly increased reliance on borrowing. The outcome,
given that credit is never inexhaustible, is, invariably, a debt crisis and a ʻlost decadeʼ or more of
economic growth (pp. 32-33). If Chinaʼs leaders are somehow dreaming that their country is so
special that it can defy the pull of economic gravity indefinitely, they are, according to Pettis, in
for a rude awakening; ʻOnce China reaches its debt capacity limits, perhaps in four to five
years, growth will inexorably come crashing downʼ (p. 43).
1
The key determinant in all of this is value. At the outset of the development process, Pettis
argues, loss of value, i.e. waste, is not a serious issue, for ʻ…in the early stages for most countries
that have followed the investment-driven growth model, when investment is low, the diversion
of household wealth into investment in capacity and infrastructure is likely to be economically
productive.ʼ But such benign conditions rarely last. ʻThe longer heavily subsidized investment
continues, however, the more likely that cheap capital and socialized credit risk will be used to
fund economically wasteful productsʼ (p. 39), something that is as true of manufacturing as it is
of infrastructure, he asserts. This creates the apparently bizarre situation in which ʻcapital
users begin to destroy wealth, but they nonetheless show profits by passing on more than 100
percent of the losses onto households.ʼ The heirs of Mao cannot claim to have discovered a way
to escape such a fate, for ʻthere is substantial evidence to suggest that Chinaʼs state-owned
sector in the aggregate has been a massive value destroyer for most if not all of the past
decadeʼ (p. 41). Settling the bill for this destruction, not least in the shape of dealing effectively
with non-performing loans, cannot be avoided forever; the longer the reckoning is put off by
further borrowing, the greater the eventual damage that will need to be repaired.
According to Pettis, then, in a matter of a few years Chinaʼs model of state investment will
likely come to grief, and in the process public spending and private consumption will begin to
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move back into balance, automatically. In the most general sense, then, change is completely
unavoidable. A rebalancing there will be; the only question is how it will take place and the
price that will be paid for it. For if rebalancing cannot be brought about other than through a
debt crisis and the socialization of the resulting costs, this presumably means that when
investment and consumption do eventually come into line, it will be at very much lower
absolute levels for both. How to avoid this? One thing at least is clear to Pettis and other
commentators; a return to the status quo ante, to state capitalism Mark 1, is not feasible. The
financial repression on which it was based, and the export competitiveness that was its
crowning glory, both belong firmly to the past, he argues (p. 92). The future, it seems to be
widely agreed, lies in transforming the domestic sector and in looking for growth by unleashing
Chinaʼs consumers.
This provides us with our second set of problems; what kind of systemic change should
Chinaʼs policymakers attempt, and how can they manage the transition to a new world most
effectively and at lowest cost? The goal is a clear one; to engineer a sharp reversal of a negative
trend that has gathered pace since 2000, the year when, Pettis tells us, ʻChinese household
consumption represented a meagre 46 percent of GDP…By 2005, household consumption in
China had declined to around 40 percent of GDP. With the exception of a few very special and
unique cases, this level is unprecedented in modern economic history…[but in] 2011…consump-
tion declined to an astonishing 34-35 percent of GDP. This level is almost surrealʼ (pp. 24, 27).
How much money is to be taken out of the stateʼs pockets and put back into those of individual
consumers, and how best, and how quickly, the transfer is to be effected are, though, tricky
calculations. Pettis identifies a maximum of six possible scenarios (pp.87-88); none of them, he
concedes, is pain-free.
Pettis walks us through again (pp. 101-108) the reasons why one of them, the choice to do
nothing, leads in fairly short order to disaster, citing the warnings of that modern Cassandra,
Charlene Chu (formerly of the Fitch Ratings Agency), about the ogres that now prowl in the
spreading murk of the ʻshadow bankingʼ sector. Another option, a radical reduction in state
investment, would inevitably produce a surge in unemployment, and although this could
initially be offset by creating new public sector jobs, Pettis argues that the net effect would
simply be to raise government debt to unsustainable levels, meaning that the cure would be at
least as bad as the disease. Other strategies involve taking take direct aim at increasing the
disposable income of households, either by raising interest rates on their savings, forcing up the
value of the currency, increasing wages, or reducing taxes. Each of these various approaches
would affect different sectors of society in different ways (pp. 94-96 ), but all of them would
inflict very significant pain on the state sector, either through higher costs, lost
competitiveness, increased cost of capital, or a combination of all three. More than that, such
changes would have to be pushed through quickly enough to avert disaster, yet such speedy
action would create ʻ very difficult economic and social conditions, ʼ chief amongst them a
massive rise in unemployment (p. 109 ). Every one of these solutions, then, seems fated to
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encounter very significant economic obstacles.
For Pettis, but a single option remains; an extensive and genuine program of privatization.
This would partly take the form of granting farmers full title to their land and giving residency
status to migrants who have left the countryside for urban areas; but at its core would be the
transfer of ownership of the commanding heights of the economy into private hands, either
those of Chinese nationals or of foreigners. The prize, Pettis believes, would be well worth the
having, for the ʻcombination of privatization and elimination of subsidized capital would end the
tendency for the Chinese financial system to waste capital on a massive scaleʼ (p. 112 ). Yet
objections to such a course of action from the political elite would be vociferous. Nor would they
necessarily welcome one further benefit of a truly privatized China, the arrival on the scene of
value investors to complement the speculators who alone can function in the current
environment where any decision to put money into an enterprise is hedged about by
ʻuncertainty surrounding the quality of economic and financial statement information…[and by]
…the large variety of non-economic factors that can influence prices.ʼ Before value investors
can be lured to China to help put an end to waste, the seemingly impossible must happen; the
government, according to Pettis, ʻmust downgrade the importance of speculative trading by
reducing the impact of non-economic behaviour from government agencies, manipulators and
insiders. It must improve corporate transparencyʼ (p. 55 ). But the insiders are not there by
accident, they wield great power, and they will not go quietly. So with privatization the
obstacles are not chiefly economic, but political.
So we reach our third question; is dismantling state capitalism feasible under the current
political order? Pettis declares more than once that such a question lies outside his area of
expertise and that he is happy to defer to ʻpolitically savvy analystsʼ like Minxin Pei and Victor
Shih (pp. 91-92, 113), who argue that privatization would upset so many vested interests at the
highest levels that it has precious little chance of being proposed, let alone implemented
successfully. No doubt this is the case, although the example of the collapse of the Soviet Union
might be advanced to remind the elites that they could well survive and even prosper in a
changed world. But even if they were to be so convinced, this would still not get to the heart of
the problem of dismantling state capitalism, for the very term itself is a misnomer. What in fact
exists today in China is not state capitalism, but Party capitalism, a far more sensitive quantity,
one that it is dangerous to name, let alone confront. Privatization in this context ceases to be an
economic program; it is viewed by the Party as essentially political in nature and so interpreted
as posing an existential threat. Play can be made with the word for the sake of gulling foreign
investors, but the brute fact is that a genuinely independent private sector, as understood in
the West, is still viewed primarily as a potential rival for power. Entrepreneurs, at least the
successful ones, cannot be permitted to lead lives of their own, or to get ideas above their
station.
How this is so has been made clear by Richard McGregor. Quoting the words of Dai
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Bingguo, a leading figure in Chinese foreign policy under Hu Jintao, that Chinaʼs ʻnumber one
core interest is to maintain its fundamental system and state security,ʼ McGregor comments
that ʻState sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic development, the priorities of any
state, all are subordinate to the need to keep the Party in powerʼ (2010: p. xii). The Party is
content to operate behind the façade of the state ‒ indeed it sees it as entirely to its advantage
to mask itself in this way. But that does not prevent it maintaining barriers, subtle but
unyielding, to any loss of essential control over all aspects of Chinese life, including the
economy. And it has a very extensive apparatus to patrol those barriers, in the shape of the
Central Organization Department, ʻthe human resources arm of the Partyʼ (ibid., p. 72), which
controls appointments not only within government itself but also in the key state-owned
enterprises, powers revealed in dramatic if clumsy fashion in the November 2004 reshuffle of
the top executives at Chinaʼs three big state-owned telecoms companies (ibid., pp. 84-85). The
motives of the puppeteers in this and other less publicized instances were transparent; they
were faithfully carrying out the work of the Central Organization Department ʻas a gatekeeper
that ensures the total loyalty of senior cadres to the Party and its leadersʼ (ibid., p. 76).
It is this obsession with loyalty, just beneath whose surface lies the fear of another
Tiananmen, that so greatly complicates any notion of privatizing the SOEs, for it permeates the
political membrane in which the entire economy of China is set. Even apparently simple terms
like ʻpropertyʼ and ʻownershipʼ find themselves enmeshed in it. As McGregor notes,
The confusion about what is public and what is private is a deliberate result of the systemʼs
lingering wariness about clarifying ownership. Ask any genuine entrepreneur whether their
company is private, or ʻsinyingʼ, literally, ʻprivately runʼ, it is striking how many still resist the
description in favour of the more politically correct tag ʻminyinʼ, which means ʻrun by the peopleʼ.
In a peopleʼs republic founded on a commitment to abolish private wealth, an enterprise which is
ʻrun by the peopleʼ, even if it is owned by an individual, is more favoured than a company that
parades itself as purely private. (Ibid., p. 200)
In such a world, finding entrepreneurs who see themselves as being entirely independent of
the party, and who might therefore be fitted to turn SOEs into genuinely private enterprises, is
akin to searching for water in the Sahara. McGregor cites the wisdom of Wang Shi, Board
Chairman of China Vanke, which is billed as the largest residential real estate developer in the
world.
In late 2008, Wang summed up the rules he had learnt for doing business as an entrepreneur in
China. From the moment he established his private business, he said, he had been careful to take on
a government shareholder, to give his company a ʻ red hat ʼ. ʻYou take too much, the state is
unhappy, and you take too little, you get upset with yourself, ʼ he said. When this first state
shareholder was replaced a few years later, he made sure that his new partner was state-owned as
well. The first rule, he said, was that you will not develop quickly without a ʻred hatʼ, or a state
partner. And second, you had better be careful about making it big without one. He had no need to
articulate the third rule, which he had learnt in the wake of 1989: to stay out of politics altogether.
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(Ibid., p. 208)
No company in any country, of course, can afford to exclude the government from its
calculations, but there are not so many regimes whose ʻultimate aim…[is] to have a permanent
party presence in every large private company in the countryʼ (ibid., p. 214), nor that see fit to
organize sessions for leading young entrepreneurs at the Central Party School in the nationʼs
capital with the dual aims of indoctrination and driving home to them the relatively lowly place
in the countryʼs hierarchy that they occupy (ibid., pp. 226-228).
Rebalancing the Chinese economy by transferring resources from the public to the private
sector is, therefore, nothing like as straightforward as it sounds. Pettis suggests (p. 112 ) a
variety of ways in which it might be tried, including the distribution of vouchers granting
ownership of SOEʼs to households, but it is difficult to see how this would create the kind of
independent corporate governance needed to achieve a decisive break with the model of the
past. Without a willingness on the part of the Party to relinquish its grip on the key levers of
economic life ( thereby putting its own future on the line ), the prospects for a managed
rebalancing seem remote, meaning that the economic tremors now being felt will almost
certainly be allowed to increase steadily in frequency and intensity.
If a managed rebalancing is indeed off the agenda, we arrive at our final question; what will
happen if the chief relics of the heroic era of Party capitalism, especially the SOEs, remain in
being and increasingly come to act as a drag on economic growth? What will Chinese
policymakers try to do, short of taking off their mind-forged manacles? The new leadership
installed in November 2012 has begun to give its own answer to that question. Under Xi
Jinping, an individual far more forceful than Hu Jintao, an ʻambitiousʼ reform agenda for the
economy was outlined at the 3
rd
Plenum of the 18
th
Party Congress in November 2013. Change
there would be, but it would be measured; while it would mean ʻgiving the market a “decisive”
role in resource allocation ʼ and recognizing ʻ the equal importance of state and non-state
ownership ʼ, the issue of state control of assets was firmly excluded from the agenda for
discussion, ʻprivatization was off the tableʼ (Kroeber, 2013 ). Rather, the new strategy would
involve the government removing itself from decisions on the cost of basic economic resources
like capital, energy and land on which it had hitherto kept a tight grip. These would now be
decided by market forces, which change, it was said, would promote competition within the
state sector and so force the SOEs to become more efficient. Private enterprises were also
supposed to benefit from easier access to key resources, giving further impetus to competition.
Little overt attention was given to the disruptive effects of such a course of action, though
observers like Arvind Subramanian have pointed out the difficulties of any attempt to exit
from a regimen of ʻdistorted pricesʼ.
Adjustments to these prices will no doubt test the Chinese economic system. Realistic prices of
capital, and the elimination of financial repression, might reduce growth and result in large declines
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in investment, which has been the engine of growth. In turn, this will cause severe banking system
stress. (2011, ch. 7)
But even if such turbulence can be ridden out, how will the new policy promote
rebalancing? In what ways will changes in the pricing of resources transfer wealth from the
state to the consumer sector? If the price of capital were to be allowed to rise to its ʻnaturalʼ
level, then the resulting higher interest rates would certainly benefit Chinese savers who have
endured decades of financial repression ( enforced low interest rates ) designed to provide
manufacturers, predominantly in the state sector, with cheap capital. But would such an
increase in spending power not be offset by rising prices that consumers would have to pay for
other commodities?
A case in point is one of the most basic resources of all, and one that remains very seriously
under-priced just at a time when it is becoming increasingly scarce in China; water. To date
there seems to have been no dramatic initiative under Xi Jinping to allow the price of water to
rise to reflect its true value and the constraints on its supply, a move that would probably
reduce waste and pollution overnight (and these are important enough considerations in their
own right, since, as Ma and Adams note (p. 42), ʻChinaʼs water problems are measured in a
variety of ways, and the results are universally alarming ʼ ). Government caution, indeed
inaction, here is easy enough to understand, though; neither industry, agriculture nor
consumers in China would welcome such a rise, to put it mildly. So it has proven much easier
politically for Chinaʼs leaders to engage in competition for water with their countryʼs neighbors
(Economy and Levi, 2011, ch. 10 ) and to push ahead with the grandiose South-North Water
Transfer Project that will allegedly solve problems of imbalances of supply, but which has been
criticised for ignoring the entire issue of water scarcity and for being likely to result in the
creation of as many losers as winners (Hornby, 2014). But even if the political courage could be
summoned from somewhere to address the pricing of this particular key resource, using it as a
mechanism for rebalancing would need to involve differential price regimens for the state and
household sectors, and there is no sign of this being considered. It would also be a spur to state
sector efficiency to charge SOEs more than private companies for water, but again this seems
to be a bridge way too far politically.
At the root of such immobilism lies fear; fear of unpopularity, fear of another Tiananmen,
fear of the annihilation for the Party in the same swift and crushing manner as was visited on
its Soviet parent in 1990 - hence the leadershipʼs wariness and barely-concealed trepidation
about what has recently been happening on the streets of Hong Kong. In this context, the very
noticeable strengthening of the machinery of state control undertaken by Xi Jinping since his
ascent to power is no accident, and the new firm hand is just as apparent in the ideological
sphere as elsewhere. This, despite the contradictions that it entails, such as those that were
implicit in the ʻsomber, secretiveʼ Document 9 issued to Party cadres in August, 2013, with its
attacks not just on ʻWestern-inspired notions of media independence and civic participationʼ,
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but also on ʻardently pro-market “neo-liberalism”…[by which] Mr Xi has signaled a shift to a
more conservative, traditional leftist stance with his “rectification” campaign…ʼ (Buckley, 2013).
The belief that ʻmarket forces ʼ can be harnessed, reined in or spurred on by government
according to whim, that the Chinese economy can be controlled and not-controlled at one and
the same time, is evidence that the ʻidentity crisisʼ which David Shambaugh detects in Chinaʼs
foreign policy (2013, ch. 8) has its roots in a crisis of exactly the same type that afflicts the Party
itself; it claims to know what it is and what it wants, but what it is and what it wants are
inherently self-contradictory.
In such a world, policy in general, and economic policy in particular, falls victim to the
search for simulacra.
2
One of the most recent examples of this concerns the perennial, and
perennially vexing, question of rural landownership. Agricultural reform in the post-Mao era
under Deng Xiaoping achieved remarkable productivity increases through the ʻhousehold
responsibility systemʼ, under which government quotas were reduced and surpluses could be
sold at market prices. But these changes did not touch the land itself, Deng perhaps being
mindful of Leninʼs ʻmistakenʼ promise of ʻland to the peasants,ʼ the fruits of which generosity
had to be clawed back at immense cost via collectivisation in the 1930s. Allowing farmers
actually to own the land they till is even today too thorny an issue for Xi Jinping to touch, even
if he wished to, not least because of the financial dependence of local government authorities on
their powers to re-designate such land for industrial purposes and profit handsomely thereby.
So instead Xi has just begun to tout a new initiative being promoted in Yangling and elsewhere,
one that can only be described as pseudo-privatisation.
The measure, called liuzhuan, stops short of privatization but gives farmers land-use rights that
they can transfer to others in exchange for a rental fee.
The goal is to simulate a private land market and allow Chinaʼs family-run, labor-intensive farms to
change hands and be amalgamated into large-scale, industrialized businesses. (Johnson, 2014)
The ʻsimulationʼ here is the hallmark of the Partyʼs involvement in the economy. It appears
to grant the fact of ownership without actually doing so, and it depends entirely on trusting
what cannot be trusted, since the gift of land-use rights can in both theory and practice be
revoked at any point if it proves to be politically inconvenient. It is this problem of trust that is
the chief barrier to meaningful reform here and in every other instance.
Evidence for this may be beginning to accumulate in the housing sector, which for the
moment is the epicentre of Chinaʼs economic difficulties. The property bubble may have begun
to deflate, but managing the fabric as it subsides is going to be an extraordinarily difficult
enterprise, particularly for a regime that has absolutely no experience in the field (though it
may take a certain cold comfort from the performance of those did have experience when
attempting to manage the bursting of subprime in the U.S. ). The way that governmental
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reactions to the first signs of stress among housing developers have been interpreted is a
reminder of how politicized the economy of China remains. Take, for example, the arrest in
Hong Kong in late August, 2014, of Chen Zhuo Lin, chairman of Agile Property Holdings, one of
the ten largest property developers on the mainland, and his subsequent unexplained
detention. It is susceptible of a number of explanations. One is that he had simply forgotten
Wang Shiʼs third law of doing business in China and had allowed himself to become too close to
Zhou Yongkang, formerly the immensely powerful head of the countryʼs security apparatus
but now one of the chief targets of Xi Jinpingʼs anti-corruption drive. But it has also been noted
that his initial arrest ʻcomes at a time when Chinese property companies are under pressure
from government efforts to make housing more affordable in the world ʼ s second-largest
economy ʼ (McMillan, 2014 ). In one sense it does not matter whether there is in fact any
connection between the arrest and government policy; the simple fact that such a link can be
seen as plausible is testimony to the immense power that the Party wields, in this instance
through its complete control of the judiciary. All of China ʼ s entrepreneurs are just as
individually vulnerable as any of the ʻcrony capitalistsʼ of Vladimir Putinʼs Russia, and they
would be unwise not to own that it does not pay, materially or in any other way, to cross the
Party in any respect. They and their wealth ultimately exist on sufferance, so that while a ʻred
hatʼ will never afford complete protection to the wearerʼs neck (as the case of Chen Zhuo Lin
may yet turn out to illustrate), it must still be seen as a good deal better than no hat at all.
So under Xi Jinping the fundamentals seem to be unchallengeable, and the purpose of any
reform will remain what it has always been since Deng Xiaoping set out to ʻliberalizeʼ the
countryʼs economy. For even where this seemed to involve opening up the country to market
forces and foreign influence in areas like Guangdong and the Yangtze River Delta, the truth of
the matters is, as Carl Walter and Fraser Howie remind us,
There is a parallel economy that is geographic as well as politically strategic. This is commonly
referred to as the economy inside the system ( tizhinei… ) and from the Communist Party ʼ s
viewpoint, it is the real political economy. All of the stateʼs financial, material, and human resources,
including the policies that have opened the country to foreign investment, have been and continue
to be directed at the system. Improving and strengthening it has been the goal of every reform
effort undertaken by the Party since 1978…
The resemblance of todayʼs commercial sector in China, both foreign and local, to that of merchants
in traditional, Confucian China is marked: it is there to be used tactically by the Party and is not
allowed to play a dominant role. (2012, ch. 1)
Xi Jinping would surely not conceive of himself as standing outside this tradition, and it is
hard to see how it can be made compatible with any meaningful strategy of rebalancing,
whether through privatization or any other mechanism. Yet all the while, according to Michael
Pettis and others, the deficiencies of the developmental model that seemed to serve the Party
so well in the past grow ever more noticeable, and its chances of playing a constructive role in
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Chinaʼs future diminish by the hour. As the irresistible force approaches, then, what odds for
the immoveable object?
（Professor at Reitaku University）
Notes
1. Economists are understandably reluctant to commit themselves to firm predictions, so we should
acknowledge the presence of the ʻperhapsʼ in this sentence. A few pages later Pettis expands on his
surmise, remarking that the assumption ʻthat China will necessarily rebalance in the next few years…is,
I think, very plausible. In fact, over the long run it is actually more than just plausible. It is an
arithmetical certainty, because it can be violated only if China has unlimited borrowing capacity and the
world has unlimited appetite for rising China trade surplusesʼ (p. 45). That may indeed be the case, but
since it is also true that in the long run, as is often remarked, we are all dead, calls for Chinaʼs leaders to
initiate rebalancing are less likely to gain traction the further out the timeframe is extended. They are
more likely to be shaken and stirred into action, though, by warnings such as Pettisʼ ʻguess that, at
current rates of investment Chinaʼs debt capacity is unlikely to extend much beyond three or four years.
I find it unlikely… that China can maintain high levels of investment growth for longer than that without
being forced into a catastrophic adjustmentʼ (p. 105).
2. Nowhere could this be clearer than in Xi Jinpingʼs 2013 conjuring up of the ʻChinese Dreamʼ, which ʻis
about peace, development, cooperation and win-win results, and…is connected to the American dream
and beautiful dreams of people in other countriesʼ (quoted by Fenby, p. 8). This trades on meaning, and
empties it of content, in one and the same breath.
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